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Abstract 
 
Much has been written to show the importance of diversification for rural African households 
because  of  the  considerable  share  of  non-farm  revenues  in  total  income  (Reardon,  1997; 
Reardon et al., 1998). The literature points out push and pull factors explaining that risk and 
adverse shocks which characterize farm activities urge rural population to diversify into more 
profitable non-farm activities. But less attention has been paid to the distinction between two 
diversification  patterns,  namely  local  diversification  and  migration,  and  their  relationship. 
Drawing on the theoretical and empirical literature, we identify the advantages and drawbacks 
of local diversification versus migration decision in terms of expected pay-offs for the family 
and the individual.  
Based  on  original  data  from  a  sample  of  rural  families  in  two  villages  of  the  Senegal 
Groundnut Basin, the present paper examines whether local diversification and migration are 
complements or substitutes, by investigating the choice of the number  of migrants in the 
family. We consider the family as a basis of reciprocal relations and point out that its role of 
insurance may differ when the member migrates.  
Our analysis indicates that when agricultural endowments are low and variable in the whole, 
migration is found to be functioning rather as an alternative activity to local diversification, 
than as a complement. Such a finding implies that with relative low returns expected from 
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Introduction 
 
In many developing countries, and particularly in Africa, agricultural income represents an 
essential component of rural households’ subsistence. However, this type of income exhibits a 
high seasonality  and leads to uncertain outcomes, because of market prices volatility and 
environmental hazards. Consequently, household members partly allocate their working time 
to  activities  which  provide  a  more  stable  income  so  as  to  cope  with  adverse  shocks. 
According to Barrett et al. (2005), diversification refers to the allocation of assets and time to 
both on- and off-farm activities. Empirical studies in rural Africa have revealed that non-farm 
income sources may account for as much as 40-45% of the average household income and 
seem to be growing in importance (Reardon, 1997; Bryceson and Jamal, 1997; Little et al, 
2001; and Barrett et al., 2001). Therefore, the image of Africa as “a continent of subsistence 
farmers  is  thus  misleading”  (Bryceson  and  Jamal,  1997).Theoretical  analysis  presents  the 
rationale of diversification as a way to mitigate the risks incurred by small producers totally 
engaged in agricultural production. They refer thereby to a portfolio theory: more precisely, 
they identify “pull and push factors”. The former are those generated by opportunities outside 
agriculture; the latter refer to the decline of expected agricultural income, and the income 
uncertainty generated by prices instability (Reardon et al., 2006). As for diversification in 
general, it can lead to migration for some family members: migrants’ remittances represent 
thus a large proportion of total family income.  
 
Despite the huge literature on diversification, to our knowledge, few studies distinguish the 
various types of diversification methods. In particular, diversification can take place at the 
local level when a household member is engaged in a non-farm activity but still remains in the 
village; but it can also lead some family members to leave the village. The latter form of 
diversification is considered as an essential component of the observed strategies of migration 
and then monetary transfer.  Thus, the present paper proposes to investigate first the decision 
of  families  whether  to  diversify  their  activities  or  not,  and  second,  their  choice  of 
diversification method. In particular, we will investigate if local diversification and migration 
are complementary strategies or substitutable ones.  
We used original data from a survey conducted in the Senegalese Groundnut Basin to study 
this  question.  This  assessment  remains  important  in  many  rural  areas  in  Senegal  where 
agricultural conditions are unfavourable. The contribution of migration and diversification to 
household  incomes  was  brought  forward  in  numerous  empirical  studies  for  different 
countries,  among  which  Senegal.  From  a  survey  conducted  in  88-89,  Kelly  et  al.  (1993) 
emphasized the extent of diversification and the differences due to local conditions. They 
estimated the share of non-farm income in the average total income at 60% for households 
located in the North and 24% for those living in the centre. Regarding migration, Diatta and 
Mbow  (1999)  found  that  remittances  were  a  substantial  revenue  source  for  families  with 
migrant members, and that the transfers were also used to promote development in migrants’ 
home  communities.  Moreover,  migrants’  remittances  seem  to  be  growing  in  importance 
because from 25 millions USD in 1997, they reached 270 millions USD in 2002 (Sander and 
Barro, 2003). 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 1 underlines the pertinence of the 
research  question  by  articulating  it  with  previous  studies  dealing  with  diversification  and 
migration. Section 2 presents the setting in which this research has been carried out, describes 
data collected and defines an empirical strategy. Section 3 explains the estimation method and 
variables  choice.  Section  4  presents  the  results  and  offers  several  interpretations  of  the 
findings.    4 
1. Local diversification of activities versus Migration: complements or substitutes?  
 
Numerous studies put forward the importance of diversification and migration as livelihood 
strategies developed by the rural population of developing countries. In fact, few farming 
households rely solely on the income derived from agricultural production to guarantee their 
subsistence and well-being (Reardon, 1997). The literature addresses several issues among 
which the motivations of diversification and migration and their consequences. We present 
the theoretical and empirical foundations developed by the literature on diversification on the 
one hand, and on migration on the other. We then propose a common framework to link both 
strategies. 
 
Diversification motives can be summarized into two categories, push factors that are linked to 
risk reduction and pull factors that rely on strategic complementarities between activities. 
Then, according to the first set of motives, households diversify their activities as to manage 
risk or cope with adverse shocks. Whilst in the second set, the driving force of diversification 
corresponds to an accumulation objective. (See Barrett et al., 2001; Reardon et al., 2006 for 
further details) 
Besides this very general statement, diversification can be defined in various ways. Some 
studies  focus  on  farm  activities,  viewing  diversification  as  both  subsistence  farming  and 
commercial agriculture. In other studies, they take into account the possibility to engage in 
non-farm activities in addition to farming. In our study, we consider this second definition 
where diversification is a mix of farm and non-farm activities integrating the relative risk of 
both  activities.  We  understand  thus  diversification  as  an  insurance  mechanism  aiming  at 
minimizing income variability. Evidence in this way is given in the case of Burkina Faso by 
Reardon  et  al.  (1992)  who  showed  that  the  capacity  of  households  to  cope  with  shocks 
following  a  drought  depends  heavily  on  the  importance  of  non-farm  diversification.  In 
addition,  Alderman  and  Paxson  (1992)  interpreted  diversification  in  terms  of  portfolio 
strategy: farmers mitigate risks and smooth thereby their consumption over time.  
In fact, in developing countries, the problem of income variability remains unsolved because 
of  the  lack  or  imperfection  of  some  markets  like  those  of  credit  and  insurance.  As  a 
consequence, households devote substantial resources to stabilizing the stream of income in 
order  to  protect  themselves  from  the  dire  consequences  of  high  income  fluctuations  and 
subsequent liquidity constraints (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). Several empirical studies confirm 
the existence of such strategies for different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Reardon et al., 
1992; Kelly et al. 1996; Abdulaï and CroleRees 2001).  
 
As noted above, the choice to migrate is partly motivated by the same reasons, but we will 
show that others should be added to these, which influence the incentives to diversify in this 
way. We identified three major subsets of incentives that drive the migration decision: high 
expected revenues; collective insurance and investment.  
High  expected  income  as  a  reason  to  move  has  been  long  emphasized  by  the  economic 
literature (Stark, 1997). Sjaastad, as earlier as 1962, formalized this idea by hypothesizing that 
the individual migrates if the net income flows expected from this migration is higher than the 
costs of moving, should it be financial or psychological. A large set of models were developed 
on this basis to assess this question - see Stark (1997) for a literature review - but most of 
them consider migration as an individual decision.  
However, it is often argued that migration cannot be an individual decision, but that other 
household  members  are  involved  in  it  (Connell  et  al.,  1976).  Thus,  besides  migrants’ 
characteristics, those of the household should be integrated in the models. Then migration is 
an outcome of maximising the household utility rather than individual one (Rempel, 1981;   5 
Stark  and  Levhari,  1982;  Low,  1986).  In  a  study  conducted  in  Kenya,  Hoddinott  (1994) 
modelled migration as the outcome of joint utility maximisation by the prospective migrant 
and other household members. Closer to our empirical field, Azam and Gubert (2002) used 
two surveys conducted in the Senegal River Valley - Senegal and Mali – and showed that the 
decision to migrate is not individual but collective. In addition, by investigating migration in 
Côte d’Ivoire, Lambert (1994) followed up the literature in which migration corresponds to 
the outcome of a family strategy rather than individual one. Moreover, the decision to migrate 
was described by Stark and Taylor (1991) as the result of a complex negotiation within the 
household. Furthermore, factors others than the expected revenue are then taken into account, 
in particular, income uncertainty at the level of the family.  
In fact, from the family point of view, the remittances the migrant sends home may be seen as 
a diversification response in the presence of risk. Risks of crop failure, price fluctuations, 
insecurity of land tenancy, livestock diseases, and inadequate availability of agricultural wage 
work, may each render the rural context quite precarious (Stark and Levhari, 1982). This 
wage should be pooled at the family level when the right incentives are set (Lucas, 1997): 
moreover, migrants’ transfers intervene especially when the family local revenues are hit by a 
random shock, and enable the family to smooth its consumption (Azam and Gubert, 2002). 
This monetary incentive is confirmed by the fact that migrants are more educated on average, 
and  thus  send  higher  transfers  to  the  family  (Hoddinott,  1994).  Then,  migration  can  be 
analyzed as an intra-family strategy to diversify risk (Lambert, 1994) and alleviate liquidity 
constraints, through remittances. 
  
However, the revenue of the future migrant is uncertain, insofar as the distance associated 
with migration, in particular international migration, increases the difficulty to get access to 
housing or employment in the destination country. Some studies show that networks, kinship 
and information play a major role on migration, when considering the decision to migrate and 
the choice of the destination area (Lucas, 1997). Thus, the presence of relatives or potential 
ethnic contacts, the language similarity and the stock of persons in the destination area, have 
significant  impact  on  migration.  Empirical  evidences  are  numerous  (Caces  and  al.,  1985; 
Taylor, 1986, for instance). In the case of Senegal, the importance of migration networks is 
confirmed by the role of neighbourhood or the belonging to the same ethnic group (Ndione 
and Lalou, 2005), the same area (Guilmoto, 1998 in the case of the Senegal River Valley), or 
the  same  religious  brotherhood  (particularly  for  Murids
1,  as  shown  by  Sander  and  Barro, 
2003). 
  
Furthermore,  migration  is  a  diversification  strategy  which  doesn’t  have  the  same  effect 
depending  on  whether  it  is  continental  or  intercontinental  migration  (Wouterse,  2006):  
‘continental and intercontinental migrations do indeed constitute two different diversification 
strategies.  Intercontinental  migration  is  a  strategy  for  accumulation  only  accessible  for 
households that have a certain level of wealth at their disposal, such as land or access to 
irrigated land. Continental migration can be viewed as a survival strategy stemming from a 
lack of wealth but positively related to household size’. In addition, other studies underline 
international migration as an accumulation strategy, and show that remittances have enhanced 
crop productivity in the long run (Lucas, 1987). 
When  putting  forward  the  necessity  to  understand  migration  as  a  family  and  not  only 
individual strategy, we also underline the fact that reciprocal behaviours may be at stake. 
However,  the  representation  of  families  and  that  of  their  internal  exchanges,  vary  widely 
                                                 
1 Murids are members of one of the most important religious brotherhoods in Senegal. They are characterized by 
their strong networks and their ability to help each other, particularly when they migrate in Italy, Spain, USA, 
etc.   6 
across economists: Becker (1976) sees indeed the family as dominated by an altruistic and 
omnipotent pater familias; yet, theoretical models were also developed, where the family is 
considered  as  a  self-interested  exchange,  like  in  Chiappori’s  initial  work.  We  propose  to 
follow the line of Arrondel and Masson that reconcile both views, and propose to understand 
the existence of families with regard to the reciprocal relationships that gather the group. With 
respect to the types of social relations and motivations, Kolm (1984) distinguished between 
four modes of transfer: “taking by force; gift-giving; exchange and reciprocity”. Contrary to 
exchange  which  is  by  pair  of  transfers  globally  chosen  by  participants,  in  the  case  of 
reciprocity, each transfer is free by itself: the receiver is free to hand out a return gift or not. 
The latter agent may feel an internal obligation to return the favour; the cost of non-giving 
may be increased by social pressure but remains free, otherwise it would not be gift-giving 
but forced. Kolm relates this type of transfer to the individuals’ motivation: when belonging 
to the same group and therefore being engaged in a sympathetical relationship with other 
group members, reciprocity can emerge. Furthermore, proximate relationships are necessary 
to promote sympathy. In fact, reciprocity was invoked as a reason for migration.  
First, altruism was proved to explain migration, and then migrants are concerned with the 
welfare  of  other  household  members.  In  most  cases,  empirical  analysis  show  that  mixed 
motivations of moderate altruism or enlightened egoism can be considered as an important 
reason to remit (Lucas and Stark, 1985 for Botswana). Remittances are shown to increase 
with the severity of droughts (Lucas and Stark, 1985), the size of the non-migrating group 
(Hoddinott,  1994)  and  the  number  of  remitting  migrants  (Agarwal  et  al,  2002).  These 
observations can be considered as signalling altruism. But selfish motivations to the choice of 
remittances level are also observed, particularly linked to inheritance (Lucas and Stark, 1985).   
Second,  some  studies  consider  migration  as  an  investment  made  by  the  family,  and 
remittances  as  a  repayment  of  cost  education  supported  by  parents.  In  fact,  a  positive 
relationship  between  remittances  and  migrants’  education  is  often  observed  (Johnson  and 
Whitelaw, 1974; Rempel and Lodbell, 1978, Lucas and Stark, 1985). This relationship is 
interpreted as a repayment of the principal invested by the family. In the same perspective, de 
la  Brière  et  al.  (2002)  presented  remittances  as  a  way  to  reimburse  the  family  for  past 
expenditures, such as education and cost directly related to migration (Stark and Lucas, 1988; 
Poirine, 1997), or to invest for the future either out of a concern for inheritance, or as a way of 
maintaining status and returning home with social capital (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Hoddinott, 
1992, 1994; De La Cruz, 1995; Poirine, 1997). In the Kenyan case, Hoddinott (1997) showed 
that the guarantee that the migrant will have access to land while coming back is correlated to 
the level of remittances he sends. The latter observation show that rules and norms within the 
family may play a great role in the decision to migrate and send remittances.  
In  a  New  Institutional  Economic  framework,  Guilmoto  (1998)  underlines  that  migration 
becomes  an  institution  because  it  can  be  considered  as  an  intra-family  contract,  which 
involves a set of mutual obligations between the migrants and their families.  
 
Although  there  have  been  numerous  studies  on  diversification  of  activities,  there are  few 
studies investigating both local diversification of activities and migration. In other words, 
there  is  a  gap  as  concerns  the  relationship  between  migration  and  local  diversification, 
whether they must be considered as complements or substitutes. Thus, this paper seeks to 
remedy this gap by drawing empirical evidence from the Senegalese Groundnut Basin.  
Therefore, we propose to analyze migration as a collective insurance arrangement between the 
migrant and his family. The result of such an arrangement is that both can rely on each other, 
even  if  it  is  implicit  and  informal.  Then  the  family  expects  to  receive  a  part  of  future 
migrants’  earnings,  but  in  return  it  accepts  to  offer  a  safety  net  to  migrants  in  case  of 
problems.    7 
2. Data and empirical strategy 
 
Data were collected in two villages, Kanene and Ouanar, respectively located in the North and 
South of the Senegalese Groundnut Basin. These two Wolof’ 
2 villages were chosen because 
of  their  contrasting  agro-ecological  features  and  economic  differences  which  undoubtedly 
influence the extent and nature of diversification patterns. Surveys were conducted in two 
steps, a first one from May to June 2006 in the North, and a second one from November 2006 
to January 2007 in the South.  
Regarding  the  unit  of  analysis,  we  can  underline  that  more  often  than  not  empirical  and 
theoretical  studies  consider  the  household  as  the  relevant  unit.  However,  considering  the 
social context of the Groundnut Basin, we choose the family rather than the household as our 
unit of analysis. In the two villages 89 families
3 comprising 229 households were surveyed. 
These families comprise several households linked by kinship, living in the same compound 
and having meals together. Then, we bet that the family chief – more precisely Borom njël - 
was better able to give useful information than the heads of single households.  
 
The survey data includes detailed information on the demographic characteristics with an 
inventory of family members, ages, genders, positions in the family and activities. In this part 
of  the  survey,  the  family  head  was  interviewed  whereby  information  about  migrants  was 
asked for, including status before and after migration, leaving date, destination country or 
city, remittances sent at home and the assistance they can benefit, if they return home, were 
recorded for every migrant.   
Concerning off-farm activities, information collected includes the type of activity, the location 
and the amount of income generated. For farm activities, we recorded information on labour 
(family and hired labour), land, equipment use, crop (type, production, prices) and livestock.  
We also asked for consumption practices, with the quantity purchased and produced, and also 
family members’ contribution in buying non produced goods.  
 
The villages were selected for two main reasons: The first one is related to their contrasted 
agro ecological situation, illustrated by less favourable agricultural conditions in the North 
whilst these conditions are relatively favourable in the South. The second one concerns the 
economic  differences  as  to  their  accessibility  and  conditions  regarding  infrastructure  (see 
Table 1) 
  
Table 1 Differences in village characteristics 
 
  Ouanar  Kanene 
Soils  - Good soil quality  
- Shortage of arable land 
- Poor soil quality 
- Availability of arable land 
Annual rainfall  550 to 600 mm/an  250 to 300mm/an 
Crops  - Groundnut and Cotton 
- Millet and Maize 




-  Isolated  area  with  less 
infrastructure  for  health  and 
education 
- Accessible area with more 
infrastructure  for  health  and 
education 
 
                                                 
2 Wolof corresponds to one of the main ethnic group in the Groundnut Basin of Senegal 
3 In Wolof, the accurate concept when surveying rural families corresponds to the term njël and the main person 
who can give us useful information is named Borom njël   8 
These agro ecological differentiated situations reflect in the demographic and socio-economic 
observations in the villages. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics on family characteristics 
 
Frequency (% in family)  Ouanar  Kanene 
Family size  16, 95  18, 18 
Number of migrants  1, 20 (7%)  2, 38 (13%) 
Number of males   8, 46 (49, 9%)  9, 2 (50, 2%) 
Mean age of family head  49  57 
 
As families are larger in Kanene (North)
4, we expect to find on average more migrants in the 
Kanene families. Furthermore, even though the proportion of males in the family is around 
the same across villages, the proportion of migrants is higher in Kanene. We derive from this 
observation  that  the  number  of  migrants  is  not  only  determined  by  demographic 
characteristics. We investigate then the economic determinants of migrations. 
 
Table 3 Income composition by village 
 
  Ouanar  Kanene 
  Fcfa *  %  Fcfa  % 
Staple cropping  538 194  33, 45    24 670     3, 23 
Cash cropping  717 591  44, 59  254 161   33, 32 
Livestock   27 308   1, 70    16 910             2, 22 
Farm income     1 283 093  79, 74  295 741           38, 77 
Nonfarm income  207 532  12, 90    29 020     3, 80 
Remittances  118 513  7, 36  437 895  57, 43 
Total income     1 609 138    762 656   
* 1 € = 655, 957 Fcfa 
 
Table 3 provides information on income sources, and it shows that agricultural income (cash 
and staple crops) remains the main income source - more than 75% - for rural households 
located in the South of the Groundnut Basin. On the contrary, for those leaving in the North, 
remittances constitute the principal income source. And these statistical results are consistent 
with agricultural endowments differences in the two villages. 
 
We propose to turn to econometrical analysis to disentangle, first the numerous determinants 
of the collective insurance arrangement to send a family member outside the village. We 
define a migrant according to the following conditions:  
i°) a family member who is recorded by the family head as a non resident member;  
ii°) a family member who left home and work outside the village for more than six months. 
We consider thereby national and international migrations without any distinction.  
Regarding the decision to migrate, it is essential to underline that it can come from either the 
family member who want to migrate or the family head. However, in both cases, migration 
often involves the family head’s acceptance, and migrants who don’t respect his opinion run 
the risk of losing the support of their family. Then, we consider this acceptance as essential 
when analyzing migration as a collective insurance arrangement between the migrant and his 
family. 
                                                 
4 This observation is correlated with the average age of the family head, whereby the latter are older in Kanene   9 
3. Estimation method and variables 
 
The descriptive analysis in the previous section shows the importance of non-farm activities, 
such as migration and local non agricultural activities in rural families’ total income. Thus, to 
investigate if local diversification and migration are complements or substitutes, we propose 
to examine the determinants of the number of migrants in the family.  
 
We used the two-step procedure developed by Heckman:  
i°) Firstly, we adopted a probit model to explain the family choice to have a migrant. This 
choice took value 1 if the family has at least one migrant and 0 otherwise.  
ii°) Secondly, for families having at least one migrant, we regressed the number of migrants 
on some explicative variables, such as the characteristics of the family and migrant.  
This Heckman procedure was useful in our study because families without migrants were not 
automatically dropped to the estimation.  
 
The selected variables are the following (see appendix 1 and 2 for description of variables and 
summary of statistics): 
 
Regarding demographic variable, we expected the number of migrants (nbmig) to be growing 
with family’s composition and some individual characteristics.  
As for family’s composition, we took into account the number of children (nbchild) in the 
family. We expected it to have a positive effect on the probability to send at least one migrant 
and on the number of migrants. As concerns individual characteristics of the family head, we 
expected his age (age_head) to increase the number of migrants because this variable was 
consistent with family size. In addition, more often than not, migrants tend to possess certain 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics in terms of age, sex and education. Then, we 
included  the  migrant’s  individual  characteristics,  namely  his  level  of  French  education 
(schoolevel) and his age (age_mig). We expected a positive influence of the level of French 
education on the number of migrants and a negative influence of the variable age. As for 
gender, we chose to drop it from explicative variables because of social customs, women were 
not allowed to migrate and work outside the village. So only, male migration is considered in 
this paper.  
 
With  reference  to  the  literature  which  underlines  that  migration  acts  as  an  insurance 
mechanism, we included family characteristics regarding agricultural production. Thus, we 
took into account the total amount of land cultivated by the family head (STC_BNJ) and his 
agricultural equipment through the dummy variable (equipagr_nul). This latter took value 1 if 
the family hasn’t any agricultural equipment and 0 otherwise. We expected that a low level of 
land endowment pushes some family members into migration as to supplement a low farm 
income. As a consequence, we think that the land variable will decrease the probability to 
have  at  least  one  migrant  and  the  number  of  migrants.  We  expected  the  same  effect  for 
physical asset variable because poor families, without agricultural equipment, should not be 
able to support financial costs of migration.  
 
Furthermore, drawing on the importance of networks on migration, we included a dummy 
variable  (djm)  indicating  the  existence  of  a  migrant  in  the  past,  for  example,  the  present 
family head. This variable (djm) took value 1 if the family experienced migration before and 0 
otherwise. Moreover, we used a proxy to capture potential reciprocal behaviour in the family 
through the dummy variable (strongties). It took the value 1 if the migrant changed from 
status – namely, marital status or position in the family - during the migration period. Besides,   10 
we  included  another  variable  (first),  defined  as  the  length  between  the  year  of  the  first 
migration  in  the  family  and  the  survey  year.  We  expected  these  three  variables  (djm, 
strongties, first) to have a positive effect on the number of migrants in the family.  
 
Regarding our main question on ‘complementarity’ or ‘substitutability’ of migration and local 
diversification, we proposed to capture it through the variable (diversification). This variable 
accounts for the number of males that are engaged in local diversification (note: we tested 
also  the  total  number  of  family  members  engaged  in  it,  including  females.  And  we  also 
weighted this number with respect to part-time or full-time work. The following results didn’t 
change).  
 
As for income variables, we took into account agricultural and non agricultural incomes that 
stand for the total local revenues received in the previous survey’ year. Agricultural income 
(agrelev_inc) corresponds to the total amount of income earned from farming and livestock. 
We  expected  this  variable  (agrelev_inc)  to  have  a  negative  influence  on  the  number  of 
migrants.  Non  agricultural  income  (nonagr_inc)  was  measured  through  the  total  income 
obtained from local non agricultural activities. We expected this variable (nonagr_inc) to 
decrease the number of migrants.  
 
Last, we included a village effect (vv = 1 for Kanène) and we denoted the interaction between 
the variables described above and this effect by _vv. Because of the neighbourhood effect 
within a village, we expected a positive influence of the variable village on the probability, for 



























   11 
4. Empirical results and discussion 
 
We present in Table 4 the results of the above described Heckman model, explaining the 
determinants of the number of migrants in the families of the two villages. In the first column, 
we summarize the results concerning the determinants of the number of migrant in the family. 
While, in the second column we have the probability, for a given family, to count at least one 
migrant.  
Table 4: Estimation results  
 
  nbmig  at least one 
nbchild 
 
0.171   (0.046) *** 
 










































0.057 (0.026) ** 
   
strongties 
 
0.296 (0.156) * 
   
vv 
 
0. 013 (0. 539) 
 
1.615 (0.758) ** 
 
djm 















-0.680 (0.354) ** 
   
agrelev_inc 
 
-0.404 (0.223) * 


























   
                    Observations:                            89                                 64 
 
* Represents 10% level of significance 
** Represents 5% level of significance 
*** Represents 1% level of significance   12 
For demographic variables, as expected, the number of children has a significantly positive 
effect on the probability to have at least one migrant as it has on the total number of migrants. 
Indeed, children who represent 55% of family size in average are less productive outside the 
village, and they represent an important share of family labour. Moreover, migrants are often 
married, and their children remain in the village under the responsibility of the family head. 
As concerns individual characteristics of the family head, we include his age and collapse it 
into three categories: as a reference, we choose individuals between 50 and 60.  
As expected, we draw from the data that family head’s age increases the number of migrants 
in the family, because the coefficient of age more than 60 has a positive and statistically 
significant effect. On the contrary for migrants’ individual characteristics, the level of French 
education has no impact on the number of migrants: we tested for this relationship as we 
wondered if the education level influences the choice of family members who are prone to 
migration. We should underline that, at the destination area, migrants are engaged in activities 
– such as commerce - which doesn’t require general knowledge. Then, regardless to their 
engagement in the informal sector, the level of French education has no impact on the number 
of migrants in the family.  
 
For farm characteristics variables, we introduced in the econometric specification asset and 
land endowments as proxies for family wealth. Surprisingly, we find that the total amount of 
land cultivated by the family head has no impact on the probability to have a migrant and on 
the number of migrants. However, we obtained the expected sign for agricultural equipment 
on  the  probability  to  have  at  least  one  migrant.  In  other  words,  poor  families  without 
agricultural  equipment  are  less  likely  to  have  a  migrant,  because  their  asset  endowment 
doesn’t  produce  enough  resources  to  support  the  financial  costs  of  migration.  Then,  the 
number  of  migrants  is  higher  for  families  who  are  well  endowed  in  physical  assets,  like 
agricultural equipment, than those who are lacking in.   
 
For variables standing for the importance of networks, we obtain the expected positive effect 
on the number of migrants in the family. As concerns the variable (first), that stands for the 
distance in time between the first migration experience and the survey year, results show that 
it increases the number of migrants. These finding may reflect the development of family 
networks  which  can  allow  future  migrants  to  settle  more  easily  in  the  destination  areas. 
Therefore, we point out the fact that migration is an old phenomenon in this region and the 
existence of networks should play  a major role to get a job and housing, and financially 
support the recent migrant. Moreover, the variable village (vv) corroborates the importance of 
these networks, through neighbourhood, because families living in the Northern village are 
more likely to have at least one migrant. Furthermore, the change of status and position of the 
migrant during the migration period (strongties) is positively correlated to the number of 
migrants.  We  interpret  this  result  by  underlining  that,  in  spite  of  the  distance  separating 
migrants and their families, the ties between them remain strong because of the importance of 
social capital. In addition, migrants are compensated for their efforts during the migration 
period, by getting a higher position in the group, and this stands for a reciprocity explanation 
of the migration decision. Thus, a typical profile of a family member designed to migrate -
through a consensus between the family head and the future migrant - corresponds to an about 
22 years old single male adult without formal education.   
    
To investigate whether local diversification and migration are complements or substitutes, we 
include  the  variable  (diversification)  in  the  econometric  specification.  This  variable,  that 
summarizes  the  number  of  part-time  and  full-time  family  members  engaged  in  local  non 
agricultural activities, is positive and significant on the number of migrants. However, by   13 
including the village effect, results show that for rural families in Kanène the engagement in 
local non agricultural activities decreases the number of migrants. As a consequence, we can 
conclude  that  in  this  village  where  agricultural  conditions  are  unfavourable,  local 
diversification  and  migration  seem  to  be  substitutes  for  rural  families.  This  finding  is 
corroborated  by  income  variables  because  in  this  village,  revenues  earned  from  non 
agricultural activities decreases the number of migrants. In other words, when families have 
opportunities in local diversification, the number of migrants will be less important because 
these families can benefit both from agricultural and non agricultural incomes at home.  
Moreover,  with  agricultural  income  effect,  we  can  also  point  out  the  weight  of  local 
opportunities on migration decision. Indeed, results suggest that a low agricultural income is a 
driving force for families to push some of there members into migration, because such income 
has  a  negative  influence  on  the  number  of  migrants.  In  other  words,  agricultural  income 
variation  and  its  influence  on  migration  partly  reflect  the  trade-off  between  on-farm 
production  and  the  engagement  in  migration  activities.  Furthermore,  we  can  refer  to  the 
insurance motivation to explain the agricultural income effect on migration. Owing to the 
need to manage income risk, we can argue that a low level of farm income enhances the 







In this paper, we started by emphasizing the importance of the diversification of activities in 
many  developing  countries  regarding  the  level  of  income  it  generates.  However,  the 
underlying idea of our study is to point out the difference between local diversification and 
migration,  and  to  investigate  if  these  two  diversification  patterns  are  complements  or 
substitutes. 
We used a Heckman two step procedure to estimate first, the probability of a family to have a 
migrant,  and  then  for  families  having  at  least  one  migrant,  we  estimate  the  number  of 
migrants by taking family and migrant characteristics as explicative variables.    
Our empirical illustration from rural Senegalese families indicates that local diversification 
and migration seem to be substitutes when agricultural endowments are not favourable and 
incomes from farming are low and variable in the whole. We interpret this result by assuming 
that in low-potential agricultural areas, families seek new ways to ensure their own daily life, 
and migration is a key survival strategy in such a context in order to cope with crop income 
shocks  and  to  smooth  consumption.  Thus,  given  that  income  sources  from  migration  are 
uncorrelated with agricultural and local non agricultural incomes, we consider migration as a 
collective insurance arrangement. And the rationale of such a collective arrangement is that 
some  of  the  family  members  devote  themselves  to  migration  as  to  diversify  the  family 
portfolio income and spread risks spatially. This is consistent with a large part of the literature 
showing that the low level of asset endowments and the increasing risk oblige some families 
to diversify spatially by sending some of their family members to migration.  
Identifying whether local diversification and migration are complements or substitutes can 
allow us to better understand why the number of migrants is higher in some areas and lower in 
others. And at a macro level, this distinction could become a good indicator for policymakers 
to elaborate their programmes by taking into account the characteristics of these two types of 
diversification, widely developed in rural areas of Senegal.  
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Appendix 1 : Description of variables 
 
Name of variable   Description of variable 
nbmig  Number of  migrants in the family 
 




Age of the family head 
ageb1  Age of the family head less than or equal to 50 
 
ageb2  Age of the family head greater than 50 and less than or equal to 60 
 
ageb3  Age of the family head greater than 60 
 
age_mig  Average age of migrants 
 
agemig1  Average age of migrants less than or equal to 20 
 
agemig2  Average age of migrants greater than 20 and less than or equal to 35 
 




French education level of migrants. It Takes 1 for those learning French 
and 0 otherwise 




Takes 1 if the family has no agricultural equipment and 0 otherwise 
first 
 
Number of years since the departure of the first migrant 
strongties   Takes 1 if the present migrant was single before leaving his village and 
get married during migration 
vv  Equals 1 if Kanene (in the North of the Groundnut Basin) 
 
djm  The  previous  migration  experience  of  the  family  head,  (1  if  he  was  a 
migrant in the past and 0 otherwise) 
diversification 
 
Number of family members engaged in local off-farm activities 
agrelev_inc  Net  value  of  food  and  cash  crops  production  including  livestock 
(evaluated at their shadow prices) 
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Appendix 2: Summary of statistics 
 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
           
nbmig  64  2.594  1.761  1  9 
nbchild  89  9.562  5.168  2  28 
ageb1  89  0.427  0.497  0  1 
ageb2  89                             0.281  0.452  0  1 
ageb3  89  0.292  0.457  0  1 
agemig1  85                            0.270  0.447  0  1 
agemig2  85  0.400  0.493  0  1 
agemig3  85  0.082  0.277  0  1 
schoolevel  89  0.461  0.501  0  1 
STC_BNJ  89  10.757  7.537  0  49 
equipagr_nul  89  0.045  0.208  0  1 
first  64  9.141  6.271  1  22 
strongties  89  0.921  1.263  0  7 
vv  89  0.562  0.499  0  1 
djm  89  0.461  0.501  0  1 
djm_vv  89  0.371  0.486  0  1 
diversification  89  0.843  0.752  0  5 
diversification_vv  89  0.483  0.740  0  5 
agrelev_inc (10
6 FCFA)  89  0.728  0.927  0  5.020 
agrelevinc_vv (10
6 FCFA)  89  0.166  0.320  0  2.464 
nonagr_inc (10
6 FCFA)  89  0.107  0.254  0  1.8 
nonagrinc_vv (10
6 FCFA)  89  0.016  0.036  0  0.17 
 
  